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ABSTRACT. The paper attempts to contribute to a critical reading of 
contemporary global political economy. It provides an analysis through an 
empirical exposition of the latent and manifest ways neoliberalism is being 
reproduced institutionally and relationally despite and because of the ongoing 
global capitalist crisis. To this end, three interrelated themes are highlighted 
here: first, the constitutive role and functional character of crises in the 
evolution of capitalism and the reproduction of its current neoliberal 
configuration; second, the continuity of long-held ideas of groups ranging from 
multilateral organizations to global justice movements – hence, the absence of 
relatively new perspectives – as evident in their respective policy prescriptions 
and crisis responses that effectively perpetuate the hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism; and third, the emergence of the political-economic regime of 
authoritarian liberalism in East and Southeast Asia as a perceptible 
consequence of the intensifying crisis.   
 
 
The world capitalist system is under the conglomeration of interdependent and 
interrelated crises. It has become palpably evident that the recent catastrophe is a 
culmination of the cumulative effects of the simultaneous crises in finance, 
production, food, environment, energy, and governance that have been plaguing the 
world in the nearly four decades of neoliberalism. While crisis moments in capitalism 
have been viewed traditionally and conventionally as a conjunctural phase, rather than 
a fundamental structural contradiction, today actors from various ideological positions 
perceive the situation as an opportune moment to advance their respective interests. 
Crisis connotes ‘the turning point of a disease when an important change takes 
place, indicating either recovery or death’ (definition from: Oxford American 
Dictionaries). As to whether the multiple crises would lead to recovery or death to the 
hegemonic neoliberal system is a question to be determined by the dynamics of the 
‘double movement’ or the unfolding struggle between those who have vested interests 
in maintaining the status quo and the forces for change. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a critical reading of contemporary global 
political economy by highlighting the reproduction of the institutions, policies, and 
relations associated with neoliberalism within the dynamics of the global capitalist 
crisis. The focus is on three interrelated themes. The first part situates the global crisis 
against the background of the relationship between crises and neoliberalism. It 
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examines the constitutive role of crises in the evolution of neoliberalism and argues 
that crises have been functional to capitalist reproduction. The second part provides 
an overview of the most important responses to the crisis from International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) to regional organizations to states to civil society. This section puts 
forward the thesis that the global crisis has not ushered in new perspectives, either 
from pro- or anti-neoliberal forces, but it provided an opportunity to re-articulate their 
respective immemorial analyses and programs. And finally, a reflection is given on 
the implications of the global crisis for the emergent authoritarian liberalism in East 
and Southeast Asia. Drawing lessons from the 1997 Asia crisis and 9/11 terror attacks 
and analyzing the current political-economic project of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), it is observable that the region is accelerating towards a 
strengthening of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (i.e., a social regime embedding a 
neoliberal market economy in an authoritarian political framework) despite and 
because of the global crisis. 
 
The Constitutive Role and Functional Character of Crises  
Crises have played a constitutive role in the history of capitalist development. As the 
development paradigm that replaced the postwar ‘national developmentalism’ phase 
in the beginning of the 1980s, neoliberalism has also survived by capitalism’s cycle of 
crises and booms (see Kindleberger and Laffargue 1982; Kindleberger and Aliber 
2005; Krugman 2000). Neoliberalism understood here refers to that specific 
configuration of capitalism (economic liberalism plus new institutional forms), that 
specific ideology (market fundamentalism), that specific phase of capitalist 
development with the ascendancy of financial over productive capital (post-Fordism), 
those specific sets of 10 economic reform policies enshrined in the structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs or the Washington Consensus), the specific class relation 
(real subsumption of labor to capital), and the specific process of capital accumulation 
(using money to make more money). Neoliberalism basically constitutes the 
fundamental exploitative social-productive relations in capitalism and perceived as a 
renewed articulation of ‘economic liberalism’ at this latest phase of capitalist 
development. 
The relationship between crises and neoliberalism can be said to be either 
dysfunctional or functional, or both. Every time neoliberalism comes into crisis, its 
critics, mostly coming from the Left, get excited about its imminent collapse and the 
dawning of an alternative system. They view crises as having a dysfunctional effect to 
the system. However, the almost 40 year history of neoliberalism suggests that crises 
have been more functional, rather than dysfunctional, to its perpetuation in terms of 
capitalist social relations, market-led development strategies, and neoliberal state 
restructuring. The constitutive role of crises in the life cycle of neoliberalism refers to 
the fact that it: [a] was born out of the crises of the 1970s; [b] has evolved through a 
series of crises over the last 40 years; and [c] dying of the multiple crises culminating 
in the present global crisis. 
 
Born out of the crises of the 1970s 
Monocausal explanations about the emergence of neoliberalism fail to capture the 
complex processes involved. Like neoclassical economics, they are also unable to 
provide sufficient explanatory value about the dynamism of actors at play and the 
origin and evolution of this phase of capitalism. Essentially, neoliberal globalization 
was a product of the complex interaction of forces, events, and phenomena and their 
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mutually reinforcing tendencies that became more conspicuous during the crisis of the 
mid-1970s. 
The 1973 recession was punctuated by stagflation that first hit the developed 
capitalist economies and thereafter the developing countries. The OPEC oil crisis 
coinciding with the US defeat in the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system shook the world. This led to a situation where the dollar became 
delinked from the gold standard. The internationalization of financial markets set in as 
a result of the gradual widespread abandonment of foreign exchange controls. Third 
World countries resorted to massive foreign bank borrowings, were subjected to IMF 
and World Bank conditionalities, and were thus required to cut state expenditure, 
devalue their currencies, and remove barriers to the free movement of capital. They 
also had to abandon their aspirations to be active catching-up economies in a 
supposedly new international economic order as they had to shift from import-
substitution to export promotion development strategies. The alternative and 
challenge posed by command economies led by the Soviet Union proved to be empty 
as they too faced growing stagnation. Global production was restructured towards 
post-Fordism and the number of multinational corporations grew. International 
finance capital gained an important role and threatened to supplant the importance of 
productive capital. ‘Sound’ macroeconomic policies through privatization, 
deregulation, and liberalization became the norm that resulted in, among others, the 
weakening of trade unions, the cutting of state budgets for social welfare and other 
entitlements, and the destruction of the developing countries’ manufacturing and 
agricultural bases. Information and communications technology, which grew out of 
the military industrial complex, was induced into the private sector in 1971 with the 
introduction of Intel’s microchip. It was advancing and became the new ‘techno-
economic paradigm’ shaping production patterns, financial investments, as well as 
social relations. 
The events leading to the 1973 recession and its aftermath fast-tracked the 
institutionalization of neoliberalism and the revival of the ideological hegemony of 
neoclassical economics (see Toye 1987). The neoliberal era as a particular phase in 
the historical development of global capitalism marked the return to liberalism with 
new configurations attuned to the circumstances of capital’s interests of the time. Due 
to the combined and uneven process of capitalist development, the world crisis of the 
1970s and its resultant impact on the emergence of neoliberalism have had shaped to a 
large extent the political, economic, and cultural relations at the level of states. They 
have taken varying forms and effects from state to state within the spatio-temporal 
landscape of neoliberalism. 
 
Evolving through crises: from crisis to crisis in the last 40 years 
According to some estimates, there have been over 100 financial crises in the world in 
the last 40 years (NBER 2008, as cited in Isidore 2008; see also Giovanoli 2000). Yet, 
notwithstanding these statistics, it is palpably evident that the majority of the peoples 
and societies in the world have long been in crisis. Crises have been inherent from the 
very birth of neoliberalism to a series of transformations it has undertaken over the 
decades. 
The global political economy of development since the 1960s could generally be 
characterized into three successive political-economic phases: national 
developmentalism from the postwar to the 1970s; the Washington Consensus from the 
1980s to the mid-1990s; and the post-Washington Consensus from the mid-1990s to 
present. Each of these phases with concomitant development models came into 
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serious restrategizing to cope with the major crises that confronted their legitimacy 
and very existence. Every crisis impels and compels the capitalist mode of production 
to innovate and to transform itself to secure its hegemony either through ‘creative 
destruction’ or instituting new political layers and interventions. 
The national developmentalism phase of capitalist development or the so-called 
‘Golden Age’ took the forms of Fordist régime of accumulation in the US and 
Western Europe, ‘populist’ import-substituting development in Latin America, and 
developmental states in East and Southeast Asia. By the early 1970s, the more than a 
decade ‘stability’ that the Golden Age brought to the capitalist world came to a severe 
jolt and the mass production – mass consumption techno-economic paradigm in the 
industrialized economies had been structurally exhausted (Jessop and Sum 2005; 
Perez 2002). As stagflation reached unbearable heights by the mid-1970s, national 
developmentalism’s Keynesian approach of active state role in economic 
development through demand-side, fluctuations-mitigating monetary policies failed to 
realize the target of full employment and price stability and, more importantly, to 
sustain the harmony between productivity and real wage. The crises of the mid-1970s 
thus gave way to transform capitalism into a new development paradigm referred to 
as global neoliberalism while at the same time allowing Listian state-led approaches 
in East and Southeast Asia as frontline states to communism. 
Neoliberalism has been often divided into two distinct yet successive phases: the 
Washington Consensus (the first generation neoliberal reforms) and the post-
Washington Consensus (the second generation reforms). The difference between the 
two phases cannot be simply reduced into a hollow state-versus-market debate. 
Neoliberalism, just as capitalism has always been, is a political project—that is, it 
requires active state intervention (Polanyi 1944; Bugra and Agartan 2007). For 
instance, the dismantling of the welfare state could not have taken place without the 
weakening of labor through policies carried out by the state. By merely taking the 
transformation of capitalism at face value, it misses the historical reality that active 
state interventions to make markets work have been present from the very beginning 
of capitalist development. The difference between the two development paradigms 
lies not in form, but in the substantial agenda on goals and strategies. The Washington 
Consensus aimed to realize an open global market economy through SAPs and sound 
macroeconomic policies of privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and financial 
reforms. The post-Washington Consensus, on the other hand, is a comprehensive 
project towards the realization of ‘universal convergence on competitiveness’ through 
deep institutional and behavioral reforms and policies on labor market flexibility, 
human capital, and social capital (Cammack 2009a). 
Aside from its dismal performance not only in the developed industrial countries of 
the North but especially in poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, marked 
by declining growth rates, rising unemployment and the informalization of labor, and 
race-to-the-bottom wage policies and labor standards (Weeks 2001; Harvey 2005), the 
Washington Consensus got into a major ideological crisis (see Fine 2001; Fine and 
Van Waeyenberge 2005). In particular, its market fundamentalism ideology came to 
blows with Keynesian economists like Joseph Stiglitz. By the late 1980s, the ten 
neoliberal policy reforms were introduced, namely: fiscal discipline, reordering of 
public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalization of interest rates, competitive 
exchange rate, trade liberalization, inward FDI liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation, and protection of property rights. But it only took a few years later for 
these reforms to be ideologically challenged, if not dismantled, with the Stiglitz-led 
and Japanese-financed policy report on the East Asian Miracle, which provided 
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empirical evidence of eight high performing Asian economies (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) 
showing their respective successes between 1965 and 1990 in realizing high growth 
and human development through limited state intervention (World Bank 1993). 
Stiglitz advocated the post-Washington Consensus project during his stint as senior 
vice president for development economics and chief economist of the World Bank 
from 1997 to 2000. With the aim of employing more policy instruments and 
broadening development goals, which is unlike the rather narrow macroeconomic 
policies and goals of the Washington Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus has 
promoted the use of ‘social variables’ to make ‘markets work better’ (Stiglitz 1998). 
Both in policy and discourse, ‘social capital’ has been peddled as the ‘missing link in 
development’. The use of social capital as a policy and ideological tool allows IFIs to 
enlarge the circuit of capital, incorporating social variables that are traditionally left 
out in mainstream economics such as states, institutions, policy coordination, civil 
society, workers, culture, community, and family (Fine 2001; Cammack 2003). It 
likewise provided the Bank the framework to promote an agenda for sustainable 
development, egalitarian development, and democratic development. However, this 
begs the question: More policy instruments and broader development goals for whom? 
The answer is straightforward: as the 2002 World Development Report title goes 
‘institutions for markets’. 
 
Multiple Crises: RIP Neoliberalism (1980s-2008) 
As the post-Washington Consensus promotes more policy instruments and broader 
development goals, the current global crisis has revealed more crises and broader 
poverty curse. The world has been in crisis for longer than anyone would care to 
remember. It is currently under a multiplicity of crises, among others, in: finance, 
food price (the Great Hunger of 2008), overaccumulation, overproduction, over- 
and/or under-consumption, climate change, ecological degradation, political 
legitimacy, global governance, oil and energy, and water. The recent global crisis is 
nothing but a culmination of the neoliberal bust, of the multifarious structural crises in 
the past now simultaneously wreaking havoc to economies, societies, families, and 
human life itself. 
The demise of the Soviet Union indirectly favored the spread of neoliberalism to the 
extent that the ‘socialist’ alternative was removed from the equation of state-society 
relation. It ought to be recalled that regardless of what may have been said about 
state-socialism, it is a fact that the Keynesian macro-economic model and the social-
democratic project of the Welfare State were meant to counter the influence of 
socialism in the advanced capitalist nations of Western Europe and North America. 
The existence and presence on the world scene of the USSR as well as China also 
contributed to the decolonization process in the former colonial empires and the 
emergence of the bourgeois-nationalist regimes. The question today is whether the 
crisis of hegemony in the world system as epitomized by the relative decline of the 
United States and the rise of the emerging countries like China, India and Brazil 
opens a new phase in the history of capitalism as it is transforming the international 
division of labor and increasing potential resource-conflicts (Klare 2002). In this 
connection it is important to realize the shift from geo-economics to geo-politics in 
command, or their contemporary enmeshment, and understand the significance of war 
in the history of capitalism and especially of militarism in this stage of history (Klein 
2008) and particularly ask whether this spells the end of the present unstable epoch of 
capitalism. This also raises the question as to whether neoliberalism has died; and the 
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answer to this depends on what one means by it. As has been defined above, it is only 
the neoliberal ideological form of market fundamentalism that has died but not the 
substance of capitalism as a process of capital accumulation and relations in which 
labor is subordinated to capital. 
The proponents of neoliberalism representing the dominance of private capital are 
aware of the crisis-prone and conflict-ridden nature of the capitalist system. In the 
words of the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Michael Bruno (1996: 4): 
‘There is a growing consensus about the idea that a large enough crisis may shock 
otherwise reluctant policymakers into instituting productivity-enhancing reforms is by 
no means new’ (see also Klein 2008). In pursuit of capital accumulation and new 
profits they always look at crisis moments as perfect moments to further entrench, and 
never retreat from, neoliberal institutions and practices. Hence, neoliberalism has 
always been promoted as a strategy for continued market-led development and at the 
same time a blueprint for crisis management. 
The upbeat attitude of the apologists for further neoliberalization does not 
necessarily come from ‘faith’ in the invisible hand or in the supposed harmony-
creating mechanisms of the market but rather to promote the interests and power of 
private capital over labor. The seeming complacency may have come from the 
historical fact that recessions are always temporary and do not result in a collapse of 
the system. A recent study showed that incidents of recessions in post-World War II, 
from 1948 to 2001, lasted only from six to 18 months (NBER 2008, as cited in Isidore 
2008). A UN (2009) report also observes that the short and easy recovery from 
previous recessions—i.e., short and easy enough as to take the needed reforms to be 
enforced—might be a crucial reason for understanding the recurrence of crises. 
Take, for example, the neoliberal responses to successive crises since the 1980s. 
During the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America, the IMF imposed stabilization programs 
for rolling over debts. The consequence was massive deindustrialization and rise in 
unemployment, poverty and uneven development all over the region. In addition, the 
responses to several financial crises in the last 20 years—namely, Scandinavia (early 
1990s), Mexico (1994), East and Southeast Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina 
(2001), Turkey (2001-2002), US subprime mortgage (2007), the Great Recession 
(2008)—have had as their overarching theme an open ‘international financial 
architecture’ through regulatory institutions that guarantee the domestic and global 
rights of private capital. Despite acknowledgement of the usefulness of some capital 
controls (like in the cases of Chile and Malaysia), the IMF further promoted policies 
toward effective neoliberal regulation to smoothen adjustment to the supposed 
openness of the international financial system (e.g., IMF’s surveillance mechanism) 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001; Soederberg 2002). 
Further, the 2007 US subprime crisis was met by government bailouts and stimulus 
packages. David Harvey (2005) sees post-WWII neoliberalism as an attempt at 
consolidating and restoring capitalist class power. The Reagan-Thatcher configuration 
of capitalism promoted a new phase of ideological assault on the working class. The 
Bush-Paulson-Bernanke-Obama bailouts program, for instance, is therefore 
reminiscent of the birth of neoliberalism. It is an attempt to consolidate and restore the 
power of corporations, assure the ascendancy of finance capital, and hence save 
capitalism from its own destruction. As Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso (1998) put 
it, citing the Asia crisis as a case in point, but still very apt today: ‘Financial crises 
have always caused transfers of ownership and power to those who keep their own 
assets intact and who are in a position to create credit’. They went on to recall the 
memorable lines attributed to Andrew Mellon, an American banker and former 
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Secretary of Treasury during the Great Depression: ‘In a depression assets return to 
their rightful owners’. 
 
New Crisis, Old Perspectives 
Given the cataclysmic effect and extensive scope of the global crisis, does it signal a 
retreat from neoliberalism? Have there been significant changes in perspectives about 
capitalist development? 
The various responses to the global crisis from individuals, states, and international 
institutions could be broadly categorized into four schools of thought: neoclassical, 
Schumpeterian, Keynesian, and Marxist. The neoclassical advice is to ‘correct market 
failures’ through correcting fiscal and monetary policies (Bresser-Pereira 2010). The 
Schumpeterian responses are proposals coming from evolutionary economists who, 
together with neoclassical market fundamentalists, argue to ‘let the system burn out 
alone’ because the logic of creative destruction and innovation in the business cycle 
suggests that during recessions ‘much dead wood disappears’ (cf. Schumpeter 1939). 
The Keynesian responses, which have paradoxically received support even among 
‘free market’ ideologues, come from international organizations and individual 
governments trying to ‘repair the system’ through policy coordination and 
institutional reforms (cf. Keynes 1933 [1972]). And the Marxist responses are from 
progressive intellectuals, civil society, and global justice movements—who have long 
been criticizing the current mode of production linked with the destruction of the 
environment—pushing to ‘replace the system’ (cf. Marx 1848, 1858). 
A survey of the responses to the crisis coming from global governance institutions 
(the World Bank, IMF and the G-20), regional organizations (Asian Development 
Bank [ADB] and the ASEAN), and states (in East and Southeast Asia) manifests the 
unapologetic project for the perpetuation of neoliberal globalization. But while the 
multilateral and regional institutions have shown consistency in the preservation of 
the neoliberal regime, the Keynesian-inspired, Stiglitz-led UN Commission of Experts 
and the progressive global justice movements have reasserted their respective 
analyses about the capitalist system’s susceptibility to recurrent crises and their 
respective calls for reforms and alternatives. In effect, despite its global magnitude 
and its differential impacts across sectors, the current crisis has not ushered in 
substantially new political-economic perspectives. They have simply factored in the 
exigencies of the global crisis as the context in their respective analyses, strategies, 
and visions within similar frameworks of their respective ideologies. 
 
The World Bank, IMF, and their G-20 Allies 
Over the last decade, the IFIs—the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO—have been 
facing severe crisis of legitimacy and credibility. The disillusionment with these 
institutions come from the series of social crises they themselves have inflicted on 
countries that they were supposed to manage, restructure, and develop. In addition to 
the not so well-publicized budgetary crisis, failed projects and prescriptions of the 
World Bank (Woods 2006; Bello 2006), the dramas and revelations during the 
successive resignations of Joseph Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur in the early 2000s 
demonstrated the Bank’s strong neoclassical and neoliberal stance. The IMF received 
crushing blows from heavily indebted countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
promising to never again be subjected to structural adjustment packages and 
conditionalities. The WTO has been struggling for survival as the almost five-year 
long Doha Development Trade Round collapsed in mid-2006. But with the current 
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global crisis, predictions about the IFIs’ imminent demise appear premature, if not 
unfounded. In a concerted effort, they have risen up to the challenge of the crisis, not 
to admit and rectify errors in the past, but to reassert their presumed legitimacy and 
raison d'être. 
Writing in July 2007, which is barely a month before the US subprime mortgage 
crisis became apparent, in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 1997 Asia 
crisis, the scholar-activist Walden Bello (2007) remarked about the ‘demise of the 
IMF’. He argues that IMF has actually been a victim of the 1997 Asia crisis as 
Southeast Asia vowed ‘never again’ to IMF subjections. In addition, the IMF has 
suffered from severe and deepened crisis of legitimacy and credibility following ‘the 
bankruptcy of its star pupil Argentina in 2002’. This also resulted in a serious budget 
crisis for the IMF since its big Latin American borrower states of Brazil, Argentina, 
and Venezuela boycotted it (Bello 2007). 
But in less than two years, the 2008 global crisis has turned the tide towards the 
revival of the IMF. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, 
triumphantly expressed during the G-20 Press Conference on 2 April 2009 that the: 
‘IMF is back. Today you get the proof when you read the communiqué, each 
paragraph, or almost each paragraph—let’s say the important ones—are in one way or 
another related to IMF work’ (IMF 2009b). 
Ironically, the very same countries that suffered from decades of IMF 
conditionalities—specifically, Argentina, Brazil, and Indonesia which are now part of 
the G-20 following the G-7’s expansion in 1999 to include emerging economies—
were the ones who breathed new life to the Fund and thereby affirmed its legitimacy 
and relevance. The G-20 Summits in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 
2009) have affirmed IFIs’ ‘important role in supporting (G-20’s) work to secure 
sustainable growth, stability, job creation, development and poverty reduction. It is 
therefore critical that (they) continue to increase their relevance, responsiveness, 
effectiveness and legitimacy’ (G-20 2009d: para 5). Furthermore, the new project for 
economic cooperation enshrined in the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth will be assisted and ‘supported by IMF and World Bank analyses’ 
(G-20 2009d: para 3; see also G-20 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). This in effect makes the G-
20 another strategic institution, notwithstanding what they proclaim as an ‘informal 
forum’, through which the World Bank and IMF agenda are expressed and, more 
importantly, legitimized. However, despite the G-20’s claim that they enjoy 
legitimacy, credibility, and economic weight, the hundreds of vulnerable and 
marginalized poor countries outside the Group are not represented and hence 
neglected. The crisis that could have killed the IMF and World Bank is also the one 
that has resurrected it. And the countries that were supposed to disdain them were also 
the ones who retain them. 
While the world awaited the G-20 Summit in London in April 2009 and some hoped 
for a possibility of change in the global economic architecture, one could easily 
predict the crisis responses of the G-20 member countries, especially those of the IFIs. 
A close reading of the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF re the global 
crisis documented prior to the G-20 London Summit could already give the idea of 
their agenda for the Summit: that is, the crisis offers an opportunity not to retreat from 
the global neoliberal project but to further advance a truly open international financial 
architecture and competitive markets that are coordinated, regulated, and enforced by 
them at the global scale. 
The World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency 
echoes exactly the same neoliberal program and project that it has been pursuing from 
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the early 1990s to present (see Cammack 2003, 2009a, 2009b). In particular, the 
Bank’s six priority areas are: [1] fiscal response to ensure macroeconomic stability; 
[2] prominent role of the private sector in investment, enterprises, finance, trade, and 
business to improve stability of the financial system; [3] ‘leveraging the private 
sector’s role in the financing and delivery of services’; [4] prescribing national 
governments to ‘hold firm against rising protectionist pressures and maintain an open 
international trade and finance system’; [5] expediting the completion of the Doha 
negotiations; and [6] assertion of the ‘key role’ of the World Bank and the IMF ‘in 
bridging the large financing gap for developing countries resulting from the slump in 
private capital flows, including using their leverage ability to help revive private 
flows’ and thereby calling for the necessity for them to ‘have the mandate, resources, 
and instruments to support an effective global response to the global crisis’ (World 
Bank 2009: xii). A couple of days before the G-20 London Summit, World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick (2009) proposed to revitalize the multilaterals, namely: ‘a 
WTO monitoring system’ to complete the Doha negotiations; a monitoring role for 
the IMF to assess stimulus packages; and ‘an overhaul of the financial regulatory and 
supervisory system’ in which authority over regulation rests on national governments 
under an expanded Financial Stability Forum, which works ‘with the IMF and the 
World Bank group on implementation’. 
IMF’s Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF (2009) 
sees the crisis as ‘a unique opportunity … to make progress on seemingly intractable 
issues’. Here the IMF has resolved not to miss the moment. While the IMF 
acknowledges that ‘(t)he crisis has revealed flaws in key dimensions of the current 
global architecture’, the bottom line is that they uphold long held principles and 
propose to impose same policies again and again such as: [1] surveillance 
mechanisms that were first articulated after the 1997 Asia crisis and the dot-com bust 
in 2001 to allow them to detect vulnerabilities and risks at an early stage for their 
timely intervention; [2] that they be strengthened and mandated ‘to take leadership in 
responding to systemic concerns about the international economy’; [3] rules 
governing cross-border finance; and [4] that they be given ‘readily available 
resources’ ‘for liquidity support and easing external adjustment’ (IMF 2009a: 13). 
 
ADB and ASEAN 
The ADB proactively responded to the fiscal needs of its developing member 
countries affected by the global crisis through ‘lending assistance’ amounting to USD 
32 billion for the period 2009-2010 (ADB 2009). As expected, it is banking-as-
usual—these are ‘loans’ extended to needy Asian countries to be paid from five to 15 
years whose interest rates are determined by the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) either on a floating-rate or fixed-rate basis (ADB 2008). Typical of ADB’s 
agenda and priorities for the private sector, 44% of the loan are for programs to 
stimulate growth and restore private sector confidence; 35% for countercyclical 
support facility (a new short-term loan extended to middle-income member countries) 
for structural reforms toward an attractive investment climate; 12% for trade 
facilitation to support private sector development; but only 6% for infrastructure and a 
measly 3% for social protection (ADB 2009). Of course, the debtor governments 
(read: the people and the taxpayers) guarantee these loans, absorb all the risks, and are 
accountable even when the private sector fails and is responsible for the crisis. 
A month prior to the G-20 London Summit, the ASEAN Heads of 
States/Governments had its 14th Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand and had a 
caucus on 1 March 2009 to discuss the global economic and financial crisis and come 
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up with their agenda which Indonesia, the only ASEAN member country of the G-20, 
is ought to convey to the G-20 leaders. What the caucus’ final statement declares are 
exactly of the same theme—even using the same words—that the World Bank, IMF, 
and ADB spelt out in their respective responses to the global crisis. The ASEAN 
leaders: [a] concurred ‘to restore market confidence and ensure continued financial 
stability’; [b] ‘welcomed expansionary macroeconomic policies, including fiscal 
stimulus’ and ‘measures to support private sector, particularly SMEs’; [c] ‘stressed 
the importance of coordinating policies’; [d] ‘reaffirmed their determination to ensure 
the free flow of goods, services and investment, and facilitate movement of business 
persons, professionals, talents and labor, and freer flow of capital’; [d] ‘agreed to 
stand firm against protectionism and to refrain from introducing and raising new 
barriers’; [e] ‘agreed to intensify efforts to ensure a strong Doha Development 
Agenda outcome’; [f] ‘develop a more robust and effective surveillance mechanism’; 
[g] ‘welcomed the new Asian Bond Markets Initiative Roadmap’; [h] called for ‘more 
coordinated action by both developed and developing countries … to restore financial 
stability and ensure the continued functioning of financial markets to provide support 
to growth’; and [i] ‘called for a bold and urgent reform of the international financial 
system’ (ASEAN 2009c). This declaration is coherent with ASEAN’s commitment 
towards the ideals of free trade, competitiveness, and an open market economy being 
institutionalized over the last decade and will be pursued in the years to come. With 
the adoption of the ASEAN Charter at the end of 2008, ASEAN member countries 
have expressed their commitment to deepen Asian integration, patterned after the 
rules-based EU, towards the creation of a single market and productive space by 2015 
(see ASEAN 2009a, 2009b). Rather than being cautious of the promises of free 
market under conditions of the current crisis, ASEAN has had sealed investment and 
trade agreements with countries in the Asia Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), East 
Asia (South Korea and China), and South Asia (India) almost every month from 
February to August 2009.  
 
UN Commission of Experts 
On November 2008, the President of the UN General Assembly convened a 
Commission of Experts to study the global crisis and propose reforms on the 
international monetary and financial systems. The experts include a school of 
heterodox economists and activists. The final report can be read as a summary of the 
essentials of the Commission members’ lifelong experiences and writings as policy-
makers, scholars, and activists. They articulated in the deliberations and put in the 
final report their long held heterodox economic ideas (Keynesian and post-Keynesian) 
and critique against neoliberal globalization formulated in words that meet the 
circumstances of the current global crisis. 
The Commission of Experts started their conclusion with a remark that ‘the crisis is 
man-made: it was the result of mistakes by the private sector and misguided and failed 
policies of the public’ (UN 2009: 132). Eight common themes have been laid out in 
the analysis: [1] growing inequalities in most countries in the world; [2] the global 
scope of the crisis that requires responses from a global perspective; [3] existence of 
large global asymmetries, specifically asymmetric responses between the developed 
and developing countries that perpetuates the unjust transfer of funds from the poor to 
the rich countries that have caused the conflagration in the first place; [4] inadequate 
financial regulation; [5] the mismatch between the pace of economic globalization 
and the development of political institutions both at the national and international 
levels; [6] the pervasiveness of externalities, an instance of market failure that renders 
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the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ meaningless—this in turn calls for coordination of 
global financial regulation and the availability of resources especially for the 
developing economies to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies; [7] financial 
‘innovations’ that failed to manage risks and enhanced problems of information 
asymmetries, and the problems of too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-be-resolved banks as 
results of inadequate competition laws and enforcement deficiency; and [8] crisis as 
both opportunity (to engage in reforms) and danger (power structures reinforcing 
inequalities and inequities). 
The Commission then went on to propose a large number of recommendations 
taking their heterodox economics perspective as point of departure including: [a] 
creation of institutions to coordinate global economic policy such as Global Economic 
Coordination Council and International Panel of Experts; [b] the need for a New 
Credit Facility with governance structure responsive to the needs of both lenders and 
borrowers; [c] reform in the systems of risk management, including the sharing and 
transferring of risks from those less able to bear them to those more able to do; and 
[d] addressing the problem of insufficient aggregate demand even after the crisis 
which makes it imperative for fundamental reforms such as a new global reserve 
system and for a careful ‘exit strategy’ from existing stimulus policies. 
 
Global Justice Movements 
‘We told you so’ has become a prominent slogan of the critics of neoliberal 
globalization as the multiple crises exploded and shook the world. The analysis of the 
global civil society expressed in various people’s forums and channels since the 1990s 
have been vindicated by the global crisis. They are therefore proposing alternative 
futures that they have long been articulating, hoping that the global crisis would usher 
in a much more caring and just world. For instance, the World Social Forum (WSF) 
and the Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF), which are broad networks of civil 
society and social movements across the globe, have looked at the global crisis as ‘an 
opportunity for another world’ and ‘an historic opportunity for transformation’, 
respectively. The WSF is said to have been ‘revitalized by the global crisis’ as 
renewed interests in their call for ‘Another World Is Possible’ arise (Osava 2008). The 
AEPF likewise continues to critique neoliberal globalization and reiterates the policy 
reforms and programs in the areas of politics, economics, and culture constantly 
formulated in their biennial Forums since 1996 in accordance with their founding 
principles for a people-centered peaceful, developed, and democratic world (see 
AEPF 2009). 
Yet, the global justice movements are confronted with a paradox at this moment of 
crisis when they are simultaneously weakened and activated. While these movements 
have been vindicated, at least in their analysis and call for change, the pro-neoliberal 
forces have been in concert in recovering the system and the maintenance of the status 
quo (Bienefeld 2007; Schmidt 2009). If there is an increasing need for change to the 
crisis-prone global capitalist system, the forces of alternative futures are faced with a 
Gramscian and a Marxist realpolitik which render them incapable to eliminate the 
recurrent social and economic disasters endemic to the capitalist system. 
Antonio Gramsci and Karl Marx still provide a classic reading of the besetting 
problems of social change and the great challenges to progressive forces. Gramsci’s 
(1971) famous line applies today: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old 
is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear’. Marx also spoke of an all-time contradiction in the struggle for 
social change that people make their own history but under conditions of imposed 
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structural limitations and historical fetters. Giving a timely analysis of today’s 
struggle, Marx (1852) aptly observes that: 
 
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of 
the living. And just as (the people) seem to be occupied with revolutionizing 
themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in 
such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the 
past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes 
in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and 
borrowed language. 
 
In a word, while the global crisis reveals the weak link in neoliberalism, the 
forces of change continue to be weaker. The old capitalist structure confronted 
with new problems has not evoked new perspectives. In this situation in which the 
configuration of political-economic power remains to the overwhelming 
advantage of the hegemonic structure and agents, the ‘spatio-temporal fix’ of 
contemporary global capitalist crisis becomes conducive to neoliberal 
reproduction.  
 
Authoritarian Liberalism in Asia 
The reaffirmation of neoliberalism despite its own crisis by international institutions, 
regional organizations, and states is well received in the Asian region. Contrary to the 
popular characterization of ‘developmental states’ in East and Southeast Asia, a 
distinctive state form has long been in the process of being institutionalized ever since 
the region got locked-in the circuit of neoliberal globalization. This distinctive state 
form is referred to as ‘authoritarian liberalism’, where a liberal market economy is 
embedded in an authoritarian polity. It is within this framework that these parts of 
Asia are responding and progressing during the global crisis. Drawing on experiences 
in the 1997 Asia crisis and the 9/11 terror attacks and on the ASEAN 2015 project, 
the case of authoritarian liberalism in the region provides important lessons toward 
understanding the eventual and most probable outcome of the present crisis. 
There are two mainstream theses that cannot explain contemporary political 
economy of East and Southeast Asia: first is ‘modernization theory’ of the 
hyperglobalist that says that globalization necessarily creates a world of liberal 
democracies; and second is the ‘democratic peace’ that claims that democracies do 
not go to wars against each other. The restructuring of states in the region towards 
authoritarian liberalism—i.e., liberal economies in the framework of authoritarian 
polities—offers a much more appropriate reading than that of the mainstream. A look 
at two major crises that struck capitalism in Asia, namely the 1997 crisis and the 9/11 
terror attacks, suggests how crises have become functional to the institutionalization 
of authoritarian liberalism. 
The toppling of two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 1986 
and Suharto’s in Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as ‘democratic moments’, 
signaling the process of democratization in the broader region. This comes at a time 
when the dominant discourse from mainstream scholars and policy-makers prophesies 
that economic liberalization encourages the development of liberal and democratic 
modes of governance. The mainstream assumes that the liberation of a self-reliant and 
progressive middle class from authoritarian rule was a functional requirement of well-
managed markets. Today, such a claim appears hollow. Theoretically, the model of 
liberal democracy generally proposed in the transitions literature was always thin. It 
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alienated the idea of democracy from its social connotation as popular power in favor 
of ‘formal’ and procedural criteria, symbolized above all by the holding of regular 
multi-party elections and the ‘effectiveness’ of political institutions. The principles 
and associated practices of people’s sovereignty, including the accountability and 
responsiveness of governments, and political expression and participation by voters 
and citizens, are hardly featured at all. Empirically, East and Southeast Asia appear to 
demonstrate a quite different prospectus from this dominant discourse—characterized 
by limited accountable government, relatively unfree and unfair competitive elections, 
partially curtailed substantial civil and political rights, and compromised associational 
autonomy. In fact, neoliberal globalization and its crisis prone economics may mean 
the end of liberal democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, if 
there is any cogent lesson that the past two decades have shown about the relationship 
between democracy and political-economic regime, it is that a market economy can 
thrive and survive even without democracy. Asian elites do not necessarily become 
forces for political liberalism and democracy; they can be downright illiberal and anti-
democratic so long as it serves their vested interests (Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 
2006). 
 
1997 Asia Crisis and 9/11 Terror Attacks 
The 1997 Asia crisis accelerated the reorganization of state authority and regulatory 
frameworks that were already in train long before the crisis in East and Southeast 
Asia. Central to these political-economic forms is ‘the emergence of the new 
regulatory state, which is directed towards the production of economic and social 
order within a globalized economy’ (Jayasuriya 2005; see also Jayasuriya 2000, 
2001). The rationale behind this attempted transformation of political authority is 
clear. Through the provision of new regulatory frameworks, the state seeks to insulate 
a range of key economic institutions from the influence of democratic politics and 
thereby safeguard the market order. The outcome is an explicit linkage between 
authoritarian politics and a rules-based mode of governance in a range of economic 
policy areas. 
Looking back on the 1997 Asia crisis experience, the political strategies and social 
policies carried out in response to it had been detrimental to democratization, human 
rights, and the poor. Firstly, the crisis provided the political, economic, and 
intellectual justification for authoritarian rule—couched in the language of ‘Asian 
values’—especially among Asian elites (notably in Malaysia, Singapore, China, and 
Thailand). These elites also came out to explicitly preach the inappropriateness of 
North and West European welfare state system. Secondly, the crisis had sidelined 
human rights obligations on civil and political rights in the name of surveillance and 
internal security (such as in Malaysia and Singapore) and on social and economic 
rights in the name of belt-tightening measures (resulting in the reduction of social 
spending in many countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand). And 
thirdly, the policy responses to the crisis from governments and international 
institutions were designed to save and protect the market, businesses, and 
corporations. For instance, the Second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM-2) held in 
London in 1998 created the ‘ASEM Trust Fund’ which eventually proved to be 
lacking in political will and institutional mechanisms to ensure that the fund targets 
the poor and the workers who were the most vulnerable and adversely affected groups 
during the crisis. In short, in times of crisis democratization may be stalled, human 
rights compromised, and the poor severely neglected. 
Even the 9/11 terror attack has not jolted Asia out of the institutionalization of 
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authoritarian liberalism. In fact, the US-led war on terror has provided ‘exceptional’ 
powers to Asian governments through the expansion of their discretionary powers of 
detention and surveillance. Asian (semi-)authoritarian regimes have become strategic 
sites of opposing terrorism. The human rights situation in the region after the events 
of 9/11 has been alarmingly dismal, hitting the headlines which range from numerous 
cases of outright killing of human rights defenders and journalists in the Philippines to 
the killing and harassment of monks and their sympathizers in Burma. 
Post-9/11 Asia is by far a region of authoritarianisms—a security complex of 
authoritarianisms. Regional stability appears to come from a ‘peaceful coexistence 
among authoritarianisms’, rather than among democracies, following the policy of 
non-interference which every government in the region normatively proclaims. The 
region is progressing towards the resurgence or deepening of variations of 
authoritarianisms: semi-authoritarian regimes in Malaysia and Singapore; the military 
government in Myanmar; the influence and prominent role of the military and 
monarchy in Thailand; one-party rule in China, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; culture 
of impunity and continued militarization in Aceh and Papua in Indonesia; and an 
administration predisposed to authoritarianism in the Philippines. Time and again, 
numerous researches conclude that it is under conditions of authoritarianism, 
alongside war and poverty, in which governments and people are most likely to 
commit large scale murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. 
 
The ASEAN 2015 Project Towards a Single Market 
The current responses of East and Southeast Asian states to the global crisis are bold 
and explicit that there is no backtracking on authoritarian liberalism. The multi-billion 
dollar economic stimulus packages carried out by these countries as well as the multi-
million loans they have received from the ADB are all directed and oriented towards 
economic growth recovery, private sector assistance, and an open market economy, 
and less on social protection for the poor (see ASEAN Affairs 2008; ADB 2009). Still, 
in a highly volatile political-economic situation there are risks that these billions of 
dollars can generate sharper budget deficits and even lead to another debt crisis. In 
fact, it is in the context of the three successive major economic crises in the last 
decade—the 1997 Asia crisis, the 2001 dot-com bubble collapse, and the 2008 Great 
Recession—that a daring project for a rules-based ASEAN single market by 2015 has 
been launched following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter on December 2008. 
Add to this, as already mentioned above, is a series of trade and investment 
agreements in the region that have been signed and adopted in the first half of 2009, 
namely: ASEAN free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand, investment 
and trade in goods and services within ASEAN itself, ASEAN investment agreements 
with South Korea and China, and ASEAN trade in goods agreement with India. 
With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and thereby the ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint, the 10 member countries have categorically committed 
themselves to the furtherance of free trade, competitiveness, and an open market 
economy; thus the perpetuation of a neoliberal order. All these commitments are 
expressed only on paper. The realpolitik is at the national level of individual member 
countries. The feasibility of this vision comes into conflict with the realpolitik of the 
nature of Asian elites—that is, it is their respective interests, not ideology, that matter 
at all times. Asian elites can be profoundly anti-market and counter-competitive so 
long as it serves their interests.  
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Concluding Remarks 
This paper has addressed three interrelated themes with the hope of contributing to a 
critical understanding of the dynamics in contemporary political economy in which 
the project of neoliberal reproduction persists in the context of the global capitalist 
crisis: [a] the constitutive role of crises in the evolution of neoliberalism; [b] the 
unchanging perspectives in the respective responses of pro- and anti-neoliberal forces 
that in effect preserves the policy and discursive hegemony of neoliberalism; and [c] 
the probable strengthening and even acceleration of emergent authoritarian liberalism 
in East and Southeast Asia despite and because of the global crisis. The discussion 
also points to three conclusions. 
First, crises play a constitutive role in the evolution of neoliberalism. That is to say, 
neoliberalism was born out of the crises of the mid-1970s, has evolved through a 
series of crises over the last 40 years, and is dying of, yet struggling to survive, the 
multiple crises culminating in the current global crisis. As indicated, neoliberalism as 
an ideological form of market fundamentalism has died, but not the substance of 
capitalism as a specific capital-labor relation and a process of capital accumulation. 
Crises have so far been functional, rather than dysfunctional, to neoliberalism in the 
following senses: (1) Crises reshape class and social relations but in ways that 
perpetuate the hegemony of capital over labor and the preservation of elite rule. (2) 
Crises restrategize development plans of institutions from international organizations 
to states to further advance, not retreat from, market-led development. (3) Crises 
restructure states and societies in which social institutions are oriented towards the 
logic, requirements, and imperatives of capitalism. 
Second, the global capitalist crisis has not ushered in new perspectives in terms of 
analyses, strategies, and visions. Both proponents and critics of neoliberal 
globalization have simply rearticulated the fundamentals of their respective time-
honoured political-economic ideologies. The pro-neoliberal forces are not retreating 
from unfettered market-led development, but are rather advancing their venerable pro-
market projects and programs with stronger and better institutions. And the anti-
neoliberal forces continue to critique attempts to recover neoliberalism and reassert 
their call for alternative futures. Meanwhile, there are differential catastrophic impacts 
across social classes, especially among the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable sectors. 
People and groups from all ideological positions look at the global crisis as both 
danger and opportunity. They particularly look at the crisis as an opportunity to 
advance their respective causes and interests. The danger is however manifest: the 
hegemonic neoliberal agents and structures are seizing hold of this moment of crisis, 
using it to their advantage, and hence reinforcing neoliberalism and its effects of 
deepening and widening miseries. 
And finally, there is a movement towards the institutionalization of authoritarian 
liberalism in East and Southeast Asia. It is within this emergent political-economic 
regime (market economies in a framework of authoritarian polities) that countries in 
the region are responding to the crisis.  The signs drawn from the 1997 Asia crisis and 
9/11 experiences are clear and the ASEAN 2015 project towards a rules-based single 
market is telling about the further entrenchment of authoritarian liberalism as a state 
form in the process of neoliberal reproduction in the spaces of global capitalism at this 
time of multiple crises. 
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Note 
* This paper is derived from a section drafted for the author’s doctoral dissertation to be submitted 
later on to Aalborg University, Denmark. Initial ideas here were presented and discussed in the 
conferences in London (Historical Materialism Conference 2009) and Manila (Fourth APISA 
Congress). The author is grateful for the feedback received for the development of the paper and 
for the comments from the IJIS reviewers. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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